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Mastering Bolshevism 
Rcprt  6jr Joseph Stalin, Gsnerd Scc- 
r c t q ,  to the PZmm (PZemry S c s . )  
of thf ~c1ztraZ C~nmiitec of iha Com- 
m&.ft Parjy of fh SooMt U n h ,  
Mwch 3,1937. 
OMRADES, it can be seen from the reports andthe C discussion on them at the Plenum that we are deal- 
ing here with the following three basic facts: 
First, the wrecking and diversive spying work of the 
agents of foreign countries, among whom the Trotsky- 
ites played an active enough role, affected to some degree 
or other all or almost all our organizations, both eco- 
nomic, administrative and Party. 
Second, the agents of foreign countries among the 
Trotskyites penetrated not only into the lower organiza- 
tions but also into some responsible positions. 
Third, some of our leading comrades, both in the 
center and in the localities, were not only unable to 
recognize the real faces of these wreckers, diversionists, 
spies and murderers, but they were so careless, compla- 
cent and naive that not infrequently they themselves as- 
sisted the agents of foreign powers to get into various 
responsible positions. ' 
These are 'thkee indisputable fa& which naturally 
arise from the reports and the discussion on them. 
1 : Political Carelessness 
I 
OW can it be explained that our leading comrades, 3 H ;$ who have a rich experience of struggle against every 
kind of anti-Party and anti-soviet trend, proved to be so 
blind and naive in this case that they were unable to 
recognize the real face of the enemies of the people, were 
unable to discern the wolves in sheep's dothing, were 
unable to tear the mask from them? 
Can it be stated that the wrecking and diversional- 
spying-work of the agents of foreign powers who were 
busy on the territory of the U.S.S.R. could be something 
unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, this cannot 
be stated. This is shown by the wrecking acts in various 
branches of national economy during the past ten years, 
starting with the Shakhty period, which are set *out in 
official documents. 
Can it be stated that we have lately had no warning - 
signals and forewarning directives about the wrecking, 
spying or terroristic activity of the Trotskyite-Zino- 
vievite agents of fascism? No, this cannot be stated. There 
were such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget 
them, 
The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first seri- 
ous warning showing that the enemies of the people will 
practice duplicity and, in. doing so, will disguise them- 
selves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, so as to worn 
6' 
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their way into our confidence and open a path for them- 
selves in to our organizations. 
The trial of the "Leningrad Center", like the Zinoviev- 
amenev trial, provided new foundations for the lessons 
arising from the fact .of the foul murder of Comrade 
The trial of the - "Zinoviev-Trotskyi te bloc" extended 
e lessons of the trials, plainly showing that 
the Zinovievites and Trotskyites unite around themselves 
all : the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become 
the !spying and diversionist-terroristic-agency of the 
German secret police, that doubledealing and conceal- 
ment are the only means by which the Zinovievites and 
etrate into our brganizations, that 
keenness are the truest means of 
ration, for the liquidation of the 
ittee of the C.P.S.U. in its closed 
35, regarding the foul murder of 
a resolute warning to the Party or- 
olitical complacency and parochial. 
rtunis t complacency 
uppasition that in 
wth of our forces the enemy 
and more inoffensive. Such a 
It is a belch of the 
assured everyone that the 
socialism, that in 
real socialists. It 
IS not the business of the ~ohh&ks toerest on the 
laurels and .stand around gaping. It is not compla- , 
cenq that .we need but vigilance, real Bolshevik 
. .mvoIutionary vigilance. It must be remembered that 
the more desperate the position of the enemies, the 
more willing they will be to seize on extreme mew . 
ares as the only measures of doomed people in 
their struggle against Soviet power. We must re- 
member this and be vigilant." 
t 1 
In the dosed letter of ~ u l ~  29, agb6, regarding the ;, 
spying and terroristic activity of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev- :. d ite bloc, the Central Committee of the CP.S.U. called on 
J f  I $  
the Party organization to show the maximum vigilance, 1; 
to 'be able to 'recognize the enemies f the people no ] 
matter how well masked. It says in th k . closed letter: 
"Now when it has been proved d t  the Trotskyite- , 
Zinovievite scum unite allthe mosi bitter and sworn 
enemies of the working people country-spies, I 
agents provocateurs, Guards, 
1 
ku1&, etc.-in the a 
I 
i 
> '  
Trotskyites and Zinovjevites the other, all our d I 
Party o ~ i z a t i o n s ,  all of the Party miwit j a 
understand that the of Communists is 
necessary in every all situations. An 
indispensable of everdr Bolshevik in the 
present conditions must . to recognize 
the enemy of the Party well .he be 
. masked." 
POLITICAL CARELEWES 
.So signals and warnings were .given. 
What did these signals and warnings call for? 
They called. for the liquidation of the w e a b  of 
Party organizational work and the coaversio~ of the 
Party into an impregnab1& .fortress into whicb not a 
dngle double-de?ler muld penetrate. 
- They called for putting a stop to the underestimation 
of Party political work and making a resolute turn 
i.1. the direction of strengthening such work to the 
ummt, in thk direction of strengthening political 
And what happened? The facts have shown .that our 
es took in these signals and warnings with more 
This is eloquently shown by all the facts which we 
from the sphere of the campaign for verifying and 
anging Party documents. 
How can it be explained that these warnings and 
ignals did not produce the proper action? How can it 
e explained that our Party comrades in spite of their 
rience of struggle against antiSoviet elements, in 
te of a whole series of warning signals and forewarn- 
ng directives, proved to be politically shortsighted in the 
ce of the wrecking and spying divenive work of the 
nemies of the people? . 
Is it that our Party comrades have become worse than 
ey were before, have become less conscientious and 
sciplined? No, of course not. 
it that they have begun to degenerate?' Again, no. 
a supposition is completely unfounded. 
T 9 
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Then, what is the matter? Whence arises such gaping, 
carelessness, complacency, blindness? 
The fact is that our Party comrades, carried away by 
economic campaigns and by enormous successes on the 
front of economic construction, simply forgot some very 
important facts which Bolsheviks havemo right to forget. 
They forgot one fundamental fact from the sphere of 
the international- position of the U.S.S.R. and did not 
notice two very important facts which apply directly to 
the present wreckers, spies, diversionists and murderers 
sheltering behind the Party card and disguised as 
Bolsheviks. 
2 : Capitalist Encirclement 
w HAT are forgot, or 
They forgot 
these facts which our Party comrades 
which they simply did not notice? - 
that Soviet power has conquered only 
one-sixth of the world, that five-sixths of the world is in 
the possession of capitalist powers. They forgot that the 
Soviet Union is in the conditions of capitalist encircle- 
ment. It is an adcepted thing to talk loosely about capi- 
talist encirclement, but people do not want to ponder 
upon what sort of a thing this capitalist encirclement is. 
Capitalist encirclement-that is no empty phrase; that 
is a very real and unpleasant feature. Capitalist encircle- 
ment means that here is one country, the Soviet Union, 
which has established the socialist order on its own terri- 
tory and besides this there are many countries, bour- 
geois countries, which continue to carry on a capitalist 
mode of life and which surround the Soviet . Union, wait- 
ing for an opportunity to attack it, break it, or at any rate 
to undermine its power and weaken it. 
Our comrades forgot this fundamental fact. But it is 
that precisely which determines the basis of relations be- 
tween the capitalist encirclemen t and the Soviet Union. 
Take for example the bourgeois states. Simple-minded 
people may think that extremely good relations reign 
between them, as between states of the same type. But 
only simple-minded people can think so. In reality the 
11 
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relations between them are far from being those of g o d  
neighbors. It hasr been proved as. plainly as two and two 
make four that thii : bourgebEs btates; shower, their spies, 
.. ' wre&ers, divcrsionists and sometimes murderers on each 3- 
other, behind their frontiers; give them instructions to. . 
~ o r i m  themselves intd . the fietorieg ind institutions iif 1 
these'states, to mate theif .own network there and "in . 
case of necessity" to 'smash th& h m  the rear so as 
to weaken them and undermine their power. Such is the . 
case at the present time. 
Such, too, has been the case in the past.-&Take fdr , 
example the countries of Europe at the time of Napoleon 
- the First. France at that time was swarming with spies 
and diversionists from the camp of the Russians, Ger- 
mans, Austrians and English. And, at the same time, 
England, the German states, Austea, zind Russia had 
behindatheir lines no fewer spies and diversionists kroih 
the French a camp. Agents of. Great Britain *twice made 
. 
attempts on the life of Napoleon, and several times 
mwcd the peasants of the Vendee in Prance againit 
a the government of Napoleon. ~ n d  what was Napoleotl's 
government? ' A '  bourgeois gavematent which had 
strangled the Freniih ~evoiution and retained only those 
resurts of the revolution which were profitable to .the 
big bourgeoisie. Needless to say, Napoleon's governrrtent 
did not remain ilidebted to its neighbors. It also under- 
took 'its own diversional measures. Such was the case ip 
the past,. 130 ye- -ago. Such is the case now, 130 gears 
after Napoleon the; First. France and England at )the 
present day are swarining with Gmmannspies and diver- . . 
12 
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sionists and, on, the other hand, Anglo-French spies and 
diversionists in turn are at work in Germany. America 
is swarming .with Japanese spies and diversionists, and 
Japan with American. 
Su.ch is the law of relations between bourgeois states. 
. The-question must be put: why should the bourgeois 
countries be gentler and more neighborly to the Soviet 
socialist government than they are to bourgeois states of 
their awn type? Why should they send fewer spies, wreck- 
ers, diversionists and murderers behind the frontiers of 
the Sayiqt Union than they send behind the frontiers 
of bourgeois countries which are akin to them? Where 
did you get this from? Wil l  it not be truer, from the 
point of view of Marxism, to suppose that the bomgewiir 
sbtes ,must be sending 'twice or three times as many 
~~eckersa  spies, 'diversionists and murderers behind tde 
lines of the soviet Union +an beknd those of any 
bourgeo@ state? ' 
Is it not dear mat as long as capitalist encirclement 
exists there yill ' be hecken, spies, diversionists and 
murderers in our country, sent behind our lines by the 
' agents of fore* qtates? 
Our Party cbmrades forgot about all this, and having 
forg~tten were cauiht .unawares. 
This is why the spying and diversive work of the 
~rotskyite agents df the Japanese and ~ e n n i n  secre! 
police was , .  completely unexpected by some our 
comrades. 
3 : . Present-Day Trotskyism 
T 0 PROCEED. In carrying on a struggle against the rrotskyite agents, our Party comrades did not notice, 
they overlooked the fact, that presentday Trotskyism is 
no longer what it was, let us say, seven or eight years 
ago; that Trotskyism and the Trotskyites have passed 
through a serious evolution in this period which has 
utterly changed the face of Trotskyism; that in view of 
this the struggle against Trotskyism and the method of 
struggle against it must also be utterly changed. Our 
Party comrades did not notice that Trotskyism has 
ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that 
it has changed from the political trend in the working 
class which it was seven or eight years ago, into a frantic 
and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies 
and murderers acting on the instructions of the intelli- 
gence services of foreign states. 
What is a political trend in the working class? A politi- 
cal trend in the working class is a group or a party which 
has its own definite political face, platform and program, 
which does not and cannot hide its views from the work- 
ing class but, on the contrary, openly and honestly carries 
on propaganda for its views in full view of the working 
class, does not fear to show its political face to the work- 
ing class, does not fear to demonstrate its real aims and 
tasks to the working class but, on the contrary, goes to 
PRESENT-DAY TROTSKYISM 
the working class with open visor to convince it of the 
correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years 
ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the 
working dass, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true, and 
therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a po- - 
l i t i d  trend. 
Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, the 1936 
Trotskyism, let us say, is a political trend in the working 
class? No, this cannot be said. Why? Because the present- 
day Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the 
Gorking class, are afraid to disclose their real aims and 
tasks to it, and carefully hide their political face from 
the working class, fearing that if the working class should 
learn of their real intentions it will curse them as an 
alien people and drive them from it. This in reality ex- 
plains how it is that the chief method of Trotskyite 
work is now not open and honest propaganda of its 
views among the working class, .but the masking of 
its views, servik and fawning praise for the views of its 
opponents, a false. and pharisaical trampling of its own ' 
views in the dirt. 
If you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev at the trial 
in 1936 strenuously denied that they had any political 
platform. It was fully possible for them to develop their 
political platform at the trial. But they did not do so, 
declaring that they had no political platform. There can 
be no doubt that both of them were lying when they 
denied that they had a - platform. Even the blind can 
now see that they had their political platform. But why 
did they deny the existence of any political platforin? 
WTI$RI$VG BOLSHEVISM 
Beduse they were, afraid to disclose their real political 
face, they were a f ~ d  to demonstrate their real platform 
for -the maration d capitalism-in the U.S.S.R., fearing 
that such a. platfom would arouse revulsion in the 
wwking dm. 
At the trial in 1997, Piatakov, Radek and ~&lnikov. 
took a Merent line. : They did not deny that the Trot- 
skyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They 
admitred' that they had a definite, political' platform, 
recognized and unfolded it in their testimony. But they 
unfolded it not to call on the working dass, not to 4 E  
on the peopl& to suppoit the Trotskyite platform, but 
in order to curse it'and brand it as an anti-people's and 
a 1L 
anti-proletarian platform. 
The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of 
collective farms and state. farms3 the restoration of the 
system af exploitation, an, alliance with the fascist forces 
of : m y  and Japan, to bring war against tbe Sovieb 
Usqioq nmpgr.. 9 q~gg143 ,for war, and againyt the policy 
cd pew, the tg-riturial dismemberment of the Soviet 
Union,' giving the Ukraine to the Germans and the 
maritime proyipcat to- :the Japanese, the preparation of 
the. military defeat of the Soviet. Union if enemy states 
should attack it, ,an&. as a means of achieving these tasks* 
wrecking, diversion, ,Mividual temrism against the 
leadem of the, Soviet government, espionage fo r  the bene- 
fit o f  the Japan- and Gerpan fascist forces-such was 
the political platform of presentday Trotskyism ' which 
wag,set fQrtb by Piatakov, Radekuld Sokolnikov. . 
Nanually the Trotskyites could not but hide such a 
PRESENT-DAY TRQTSKYISM 
platform from the people, from the working class. And 
' they hid it not only from the working class but also 
. from the Trotskyite rank and file, and not only from the 
Trotskyite rank and file but even from the leading group 
of the Trotskyites, consisting of a small handful of go or 
40 people. When Radek and Piatakov asked Trotsky's 
t permission to call a small conference, go or 40 people, to 
inform them of ,the character of this platform, Trotsky 
forbade them, saying it was ivexpedient to talk of the 
real nature of the platform even to a small group .of 
Trotskyites as such an "operation" might cause a split. 
' "Political figures" hiding their views and their .plat- 
form not only from the working dab but also from. the 
Trotskyite rank and file, and not only from the Trotsky- 
ite rank and file, but from the leading group of Trot- 
skyites+~& is the face of presentday Trotskyism. 
But it follows from this that presentday Trotskyism 
can no longer be called a political trend in the working 
class. Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in 
the working class but a gang without principle, without 
ideas, of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service 
agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the 
working class, working in the pay of the intelligence 
services of foreign states. 
such is the indisputable result of the evolution qf 
Trotskyism in the past seven or eight years. 
Such is the differknce between Trotskyism in the pas1 
and ~ro t sk~ism at the present time. 
The mistake of our Party comrades is that they did 
not notice this profound difference between Trotskyism 
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in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They 
did not notice that the Trotskyites have long since 
ceased to be people devoted to an idea, that the Trotsky- 
ites have long since turned @to highway robbers, capa- 
ble of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to 
the point of- espionage d the outright betrayal of their 
country, if only they can harm the Soviet government 
and Soviet power. They did not notice this and were 
. therefore unable to reconstruct themselves in time to 
wage battle against the Trotskyites in a new and more 
regular manner. This is why the abominable work of 
the Trotskyites of late years was a complete surprise for 
some of our Party comrada. 
T o  proceed. Finally, our Party comrades did not notice 
that there is an important difference between the present- 
day wreckers and diversionists, on the one hand, among 
whom the Trotskyite agehts of fasc&m play "an active ., 
' part", and the wreckers and diversionists of the time of 
the shkkhty trial, on the other hand. 
In the first place, the Shakhty and Industrial Party 
wreckers were people openly alien to us. They were in 
greater part fornet- &hers of factories, former - man- . 
. agen for the old employers, form& shareholders of old 
joint-stock .companies, or simple bourgeois specialists who 
. 
were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people . 
had any doubt abow the authenticity of the political : 
' face of these gentlemen. And the sh;khty wreckers them- 
. 
selves did not conceal their distaste for the Soviet system. 
< The same cannot be said -of the 'presentday :wreckers ! 
PRESENT-DAY TROTSKYISM 
ers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are mostly Party 
people with a Party card in their pocket, and conse- 
quently people who formally are not alien to us. 
Whereas the old wreckers went against our people, the 
new wreckers on the contrary cringe to our people, laud 
them, lickl their boots, in order to worm their way into 
their confidence. As you see, the difference is essential. 
In the second place, the strength of the Shakhty and 
Industrial Party wreckers was that to a greater or lesser 
degree they possessed the necessary technical knowledge, 
while our people, not possessing such knowledge, were 
f o r d  to learn from them. This circumstance gave a 
great advantage to the wreckers of the Shakhty period, 
made it possible for them to4 do their weeking work free- 
ly aid unhindered; made it possible for them to deceive 
our people technically. 
This is not .so with the present-day wreckers, with the 
Trotskyites. Th,e present-day wreckers have no technical 
superioiity over our people. On the contrary, our people 
are better trained technically than the presentday 
wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the time from the 
Shakhty period to our own days, tens of thousands of 
genuine, technically strong Bolshevik cadres have grown 
up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of 
thousands of Bolshevik leading figures technically de- 
veloped in comparison with whom all such people as 
Piatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, Muralov 
and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere tyros from 
the point of view of technical training. In this case, what 
does the strength of the presentday wreckers, the Trot- 
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skyites, consist of? Their'strength lies in the Party card, 
in the possession of a Party card. This strength lies in 
the fact that the Party card gives them pditical trust 
and opens the doors of all our institutions and organ- 
izations to them. -. 
Their advantage lies in the fact that holding a Party 
card and pretending to be friends of the soviet power 
they tricked our peopk politically, misused their cgn- , 
fidence, did their wrecking work furtively, and disclosed 
our secrets of state to the enemies of the Soviet Union. . 
This "advantage" is a doubtful one in its political and 
moral values, but still it is an "advantage". This "advan- . 
tage", .in reality, explains the fact that the Trotskyite . 
wreckers, as people with a Party .card having access to 
all in .our institutions and organizations, were a 
real windfall for the intelligence services of foreign states. 
The mistake of some.af our Party comrades is that they 
did - not . notice, did not understand all this difference 
between the old and the- new wreckers, between the 
Shakhty wreckers and the Trotskyites, and not noticing 
this, they were unable to reconstruct themselves in time 
so as to wage battle {against the new wreckers in a new 
wa j. 
4: The Seamy Side of Economic Success 
UCH are the basic facts from the sphere of our inter- 
Snational and internal situation, about which many of 
our Party comrades forgot, or which they did not, notice. 
This is why our people were taken by surprise by the 
events of the last few years as regards wrecking and 
diversion. 
It may be asked: But why did our people not notice 
d l  this, why did they forget about all this? Where did 
all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness and com- 
placency come from? 
Is it an organic defect in the work of our people? No, 
it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon 
which can be rapidly. liquidated by some efforts on the 
part of our people. 
Then what is the matter? 
The matter is that our Party comrades have been 
totally absorbed in economic work 'in recent years, have 
been engrossed to the limit in economic successes, and 
being engrossed in all these things forgot about all else, 
threw aside all else. 
The matter is that being carried away by economic 
successes they began to regard this as the beginning and 
end of everything, and simply gave up paying attention 
to such things as the international position of the Soviet 
Union, capitalist encirclement, strengthening of the 
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political work of the Party, struggle against wrecking, 
etc, supposing all these questions to be second-rate and 
even third-rate matters. 
Successes and achievements are, of course, a great 
thing. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction 
are Uvly enonnous. 
But successes, like everything else under the sun, have 
their seamy side. Among people who are not very skillful 
in politics big successes and big achievements not infre- 
quen tl y give rise to carelessness, complacency, self -sat io- 
faction, overweening self-confidence, swell-headedness 
and bragging. You cannot deny that braggarts have lately 
developed among us tremendously. It is not surprising 
in these circumstances of big and serious successes in 
the sphere of socialist construction that feelings of 
\ I  boastfulness are created, feelings of showy demonstra- :: 
tion of our successes, and feelings- are created for un- 
derestimating the strength of our enemies, feelings of 
overestimation of our own strength, and as a result of all 
this political blindness appears. 
I must heax say a few words about the dangers con- 
nec.~ed with successeS, about the dangers connected with . . 
achievements. 
We know by aperiencx of the dangers connected 
with difficulties. For a number of years we have been a 
fighting against such kinds of dangers, and I must say 
not without success. Among people who are not staunch, 
dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently give 
rise to. dawncast feelings, distrust in their own forces, 
feelings of pessimism. And, on the contrary, when it i s  
SEAMY SIDE OF SUCCESS 
a matter of fighting against the dangers which arise from . 
difficulties, people are tempered in this struggle and 
emerge from the struggle really granite ~olsheviks. 
Such is the nature of the dangers connected with dif-. 
ficulties. Su* are the results of overcoming difficulties. 
But there is another kind of danger, the danger con- 
neaed with successes,' the danger connected with achieve- 
meats Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected with suc- 
esips, with achievements. These dangers consist in the 
fact that among people little skilled in politics and not 
having* seen much, the condition of. successes-success 
after success, achievement after achievement, the over- 
fulfildent of plans after the overfulfilment of plans- 
gives rise to feelings of. carelessness and self-satisfaction, 
qeates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual 
~ n p t u ~ a t i o n s  which kill the sense of proportion and 
dull polit-ical instinct, take the spring out .of people and 
impel them to rest on their laurels. 
It is not surprising that in this narcqtic atmosphere 
of swell-headedness and self-satisfaction, this atmosphere 
of showy d6monstrations and loud self-praise, people for- 
get some essential facts which are of first-grade signifi- 
cance for the fate of our -country; people begin to miss 
seeing such unpleasant facts as capitalist encirclement, 
the new forms of wrecking, the dangers connected with 
our sucdesses, etc 
Chpitalist encaement? A mere bagatelle! What sig-. 
nifiwnce can some capitalist encirclement or other have 
if we fulfill and surpass our economic plans? The new 
forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? Mere 

5 : Our Tasks 
H OW are we to liquidate the shortcomings in our work? What must be done in order to do this? 
It is necessary to: carry out the following measures: 
1. First and foremost, the attention of our Party com- 
rades who get bogged on "current questions" in one de- 
partment or another must be turned towards the big 
political questions of both international and internal 
character. 
2. The political work of our Party must be raised to 
the proper level, making the m#n task that of the 
political training and Bolshevik steeling of the Party, 
Soviet and economic cadres, 
3. It should be explained to our Party comrades that 
the economic successes, the significance of which is un- 
doubtedly very great and which we shall also strive 
for in the future, day after day, year after year, are 
nevertheless not the whole of our socialist construc- 
tion. 
It should be explained that the seamy 'sides connected 
with economic successes and expressed in self-satisfaction, 
in carelessness, in the deadening of political intuition, 
can be liquidated only if economic successes are com- 
bined with the successes of Party construction and the 
developed political work of our Party. 
It should be explained that economic successes them- 
MASTERING BOLSHEVISM 
selves, their stability and duration, wholly and fully de- 
pend on the suclzgses of Party organizational and Party 
political wrk,' that without this condition economkc 
. - 
- . ,- 
a~& may prove to be built on sand. 
-+ It should be rexnembered and never forgotten that. 
+. ,l; q, -Jcapiaist . ,  ea@rclvent; ., exists there will i$e 
q&km, 'd i+&si~~t . s ,  spies, tprl:@ts, sent behind t& 
fso&cm , . of the tk?~+t Union by & iYte1igence servic- 
of. foreign.states; t ~ s  aoU~gi'.be rkgaep~bered and a swg- 
gk . should ' a  carried on against. bw cbrnrades 
underqtimate the significance 'of the fact of capitdigt 
endrdement, who underestimate . the strength and s'%- 
nificanae 'of wrecking. : .  I + 
. It shoul? be' explained to our Party c o ~ d e s  that no 
&pno*ic success w&s&ver, no matter how they 
wS can,. amp11 the f? of capitalist tmcirdmmt ~ n d ?  g l ~  r ( 
results arising therefrom. r t  ) , A  
- , .The necessary measures, must be. taken to give our 
sf,@&& + 4 A - ,grid # ,  espiun~i@?' ,work -of .the. 
*ha* 
: .& It bq, 4qqd;rined $0 .our 
taw. *meptfim, 2 -  yhp Fpyy&it .he 
$ivmiQnis~. . . - .  I -. ,  e q g ;  - , ,  and . - espiuaage I work of - tbe . f ~ & p  , I , .  8 
ipte~igence., tiqyw - L h ~ p  *kdy ceased. to , be a ,
politid trend ip ,ihe ' wot~ring ,cIp* that they; haw. v. s t ;  al- ... 
ready long ceased .tq ,ywe by compatible , I .  with !- I ,' . .  
iRteiesto ,& the: W G ~ E J X ~  ClwZ thzi qy, have t~mad 4 <  i ~ t o  
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a gang of wrecken, diversionists, spies, assassins, without 
principles and ideas, working for the foreign intelligence 
services. . 
It should be explained that. in the struggle against 
con tempbrary Trotskyism, not the old methods, the 
, methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, 
methods for smashing and uprooting it. 
6.. The difference between the presentday wreckers 
and the wreckgrs of the Shakhty period should be ex- 
plaitied to our' Party comrades. It should be explained 
to them* that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhty period 
lmisled our people in the sphere of technique, utilizing 
their technical backwardness, the presentday wreckers 
with a Party card in their possession deceive our people 
by utilizing the political trust shown towards them as 
Party members, utilizing the political carelessness of 
ouy people. 
To the old slogan of the mastery of technique which 
carresponded to the Shakhty period there must be added 
the new slagan calling f o r  the political training of cadres, 
the mastery of Bolshevism and the liquidation of our 
political tmtful~ess, a slogan which fully corresponds 
to the-present period we are now passing through. 
The question m y  be asked: Was it not possible ten 
years ago, at the time of the Shakhty period, to advance 
both slogans simultaneously, i.e., the first slogan regard- 
ing the mastery of technique and, the second slogan re- 
garding the political training of cadres? NQ, it was not 
possible. Things are not done that way in the Bolshevik 
Party. At the turning points of the revolutionary move- 
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ment, some basic slogan is always advanced as the key 
slogan in order, by catching on to it, to draw in the 
whole chain. That is what Lenin taught us: find the 
main link in the chain of our work, lay hold of it, draw 
it in, in order through it to draw in the whole chain 
and go forward. The history of the revolutionary move-. 
ment shows that this is the only correct tactic. 
In the Shakhty period, the weakness of our people 
lay in their technical backwardness. Technical questions 
and not political ones were our weak spots at that time. 
As far as our political attitude towards the wreckers of 
that time was concerned, it was perfectly clear that it 
was the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien 
people. We liquidated this technical weakneSs of ours 
by advancing the slogan regarding the mastery of tech- 
nique and by educating tens and hundreds of thousands 
of teduiically steeled Bolshevik cadres during the past 
period. 
It is a different question now when we have technically 
developed Bolshevik cadres and when the part of wreck- 
ers is played not by openly alien people in possession of 
technical superiority over our own people, but by people 
in possession of Party membership cards and enjoying 
all the rights of Party membership. The weakness from 
which our people suffer now is not technical backward- 
ness, but political carelessness, blind faith in people who 
have come by chance into possession of Party membership 
eards, the failure to check up on people .not according 
to' the political declarations they make, but according to 
the results of the work they do. The key question now 
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facing us is not the liquidation of the technical back- 
wardness of our cadres, for in the main this has already 
been done, but the liquidation of the political careless- 
- ness and political trustfulness in wreckers who have by 
chance obtained possession of Party membership cards. 
Such *is ' the fundamental difference between the key 
\ question in respect to the struggle for cadres in the 
period of the Shakhty days and the key question of the 
present period. 
That is why ten years ago we' could' and should not 
have issued both the slogans together, namely, the one 
regarding the mastery of technique* and the one regard- 
ing the political training of cadres. 
This is why the old slogan of the mastery of technique 
must now be supplemented by the new slogan of the 
mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres 
and the liquidation of our political carelessness. 
- 7. We must destroy and cast aside the rotten theory 
that with. every advance y e  make the class struggle here 
of necessity would die down more and more, and that in 
proportion as we achieve successes the class enemy woulcl 
become more and more tractable. 
This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one, 
for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and makes 
it  for the class enemy to rally for the struggle 
against ,the Soviet government. 
On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the 
greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the 
fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes, 
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the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of struggle, 
the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state and the 
more will they clutch at the most desperate means of 
struggle, as the last resort of doomed people. 
It .sh6uld be borne in -mind that the remnants of the 
broken classes in the U.S.S.R. are not alone. They have 
the direct support of our enemies beyond the bounds of 
the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the 
sphere of the class struggle is limited to the bounds of 
the U.S.S.R. While one end of the class struggle has its 
operation within the bounds of the U.S.S.R., its other 
stretches to the bounds of the bourgeois states surround- 
ing us. The remnants of the broken classes cannot but 
be aware of this. And precisely because they are, they 
will continue their desperate assaults in the future. 
This'is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism 
teaches us. 
We must remember all this and be on our guard. 
8. We must destroy and cast aside another rotten 
theory according to which the individual who is not 
always engaged in wrecking and who even occasiorially 
shows successes in his ~ b r k  cannot be a wrecker. 
This strange theory exposes the naiiete of its authors. 
No wrecker will engage in wrecking all along the line 
if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest pos- 
,sible time. On the' contrary, the real wrecker has from 
time to time to show successes in his work, for this is 
his only means of keeping himself going as a wrecker, 
of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his 
wrecking work. 
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. I think that this question is dear and requires no 
further explanation. 
g. We must destroy and cast aside the third rotten 
theory, to the effect that the .systematic fulmment of 
economic plans reduces wrecking and its consequences 
to naught. 
Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely, to 
, titillate the self-esteem of our departmental oficials, to 
lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking. 
What is the meaning of "the systematic fulfilment of 
our economic plans"? 
First, it has been proved that all our economic plans 
are below normal because they do not take account of 
the tremendous reserves and possibilities lying hidden 
in our national economy. 
Second, the geaeral fulfilment of the economic 'plans 
by the commissariats as a' whole does - not mean that the 
plans -;ire also fulfilled by certain very important 
branches. On the contrary, the facts go to show' that 
quite a number. of commissariats, which fulfil or even 
more than fulfil the economic plans for the year, sys- 
tematically fail to fulfil the plans in' several very im- 
portant branches of the national economy. . 
Third, there can -be no doubt that had the wreckers 
not been exposed and thrown out, the'position in re- 
spect to the fulfilment of econbmic plans would have 
been far worse. This is something which the shortsighted 
authors of the theory under review need to remember. 
Fourth, the wreckers usually adapt the main part of 
their wrecking work not to the peace-time period, but 
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to that of the eve of war or of war itself. Suppose we were 
to lull ourselves with the rotten theory of "the system&ic 
fulfilment of the economic plans", and were-not to t o u h  
the wreckers. .Do the authors of this rotten theory appre-- 
ciate what a. tremefidous amount of *harm- the wreckers 
would do to our country in case of war, if we were to 
allow them to remain inside the body of our national 
economy, sheltered by the rotten theory of "the system- 
atic fulfilment of economic plans"? - 
Is it not dear that the theory of "the systematic ful- 
filment of economic plans" is a theory advantageous to 
the wreckers? 
lo. We must destroy and cast aside the fourth rotten 
theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement i s  the 
chief means for liquidation of wrecking. 
This theory has been invented so as to divert the blow 
from the wreckers with a noise of chatter about Stabha- 
nov workers and the Stakhanov movement. 
In his report, Comrade Molotov quoted a whole num- 
ber of facts which go to show how the Trotskyites and 
non=m>tskyite wreckers in the Kuznets and Don Basins. 
abused the confidence of our politically careless corn-. 
rades, systematidly led the Stakhanov workers a .dance, 
placed spokes. in their wheels, so to speak, artificially 
created a whole number of obstacles preventing their- 
working successfuIIy and finally succeeded in disorgan- 
izing their work. 
What could the Staghanov workers do alone if the way- 
capital construction was carried on by the wreckem in the 
Don Basin, let us say, led to. a gap between the slowly 
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inoving prepaptory work of coal mining and all the 
other fields of the work? 
Is it not deiy that the Stakhanov movement itself is 
in need af our effective aid against all the various ma- 
chinations of the wreckers so as to speed things .on and 
to fulfil i t s  great mission? Is it not dear that the struggle 
against wrecking, for its liquidation, and the gaining of 
the upper hand over wrecking is the necessary condition 
for the Stakhanov movement to blossom out to the full? 
I think that this question is also clear and in no need 
of fbrther comment. 
1 I. We must destroy and cast aside the fifth rotten 
theory to the effect. that the Trotskyite wreckers possess 
no more reserve, that they are .mustering their last 
reserves. t 
This is untrue, comrades. Only naive people could 
invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their 
reserves. These consist first and foremost of the remnants 
.of the smashed exploiting dasses i n  the: U.S.S.R. They 
consist of a whole number of groups and organizations 
beyond the bounds of the U.S.S.R. and hostile .to the 
t Union. 
Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolu tion- 
ary Fourth International, two-thirds of which is made-up 
af spies and subversive agents. Isn't this ,a reserve? Is it 
not clear that this international of spies will select forces 
to, do the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites? 
Or take, for, example, the group of the rrscal Shefio 
i,m Noway, who ?provided a haven for the* arch-Spy 
Trotsky and helped hi.m to do harm the Soviet Union; 
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Isn't. this group a reserve? Who can deny that this coun- 
ter-revolutionary group will continue in the future to 
render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?, 
Or. take, for examples the Souvarine group in France, 
a gmuP 6f rascals like Sheflo. Isn't this a reserve? Can it 
be denied that this group of scoundrels will also help 
the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work 
. . 
against the Soviet Union? 
All these ladies and gentlemen from Germany, all the 
Ruth Fischers, Maslovs and Urbans who have sold them- 
selves body and soul to the fascists-aren't they reserves 
for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites? 
Or'take, for exampIes the well-known gang of Ameri- 
can writers headed by the notorious racketeer Eastman, 
all these gangsters of the pen who live by slandering the 
working class of the Soviet Union-aren't they reserves 
for Trotskyism? 
No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are muster- 
ing. their last for :s must be cast aside. 
12. Finally, we must destroy and cast aside still an- 
other rotten'. theory t* the effect that since we ~oldheviks 
are many while the wreckers are few; since we Bolsheviks 
have the siippott of tens of  miliions of people while the 
Trotskyite wreckers &n be. nuinbered in tens and units, 
then we Bo1sh:et;iks. bin afford to pay no attention to 
such a handfhl of &&em. ' 
  his is tmhrades. . This more than ' strange 
theory has been invented 60 as to bring solace to-certain 
of 'our Ieading c o d d &  who have hiled in theill'ivork . 
by reason of their iria-bility to carry on a struggle agaihst 
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the wrecking, to lull their vigilance and to make it pos- 
sible for them to sleep in peace. 
It is, of course, true that -the Trotskyite wreckers have 
the support of isolated individuals, while the Bolsheviks 
have the suppurr of. tens of millions of people. But it 
by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not 
able to inflict very serious damage on us. I t  does not at 
all need a big number of people to do harm and to 
cause damab. Tens of thousands of workers have .to be 
set to-work to build a Dnieprostroy, but it requires not 
more than a few dozen men to blow it up. Several Red 
Army corps may be necessary to win a battle during war - 
time. But it only needs a few spies somewhere; in the army 
headquarters or even in a' divisional staff ta steal the plan 
of operations and pass it on to the enemy for this gain to 
be lost. Thousands of people are required to build a big 
railway bridge, but a few people are sufficient to bl& 
it ap. Tens and hundreds of such examples could be 
quoted. 
Consequently, we must not comfart aurselves with the 
fact- that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite- wreck- 
eis, are few. 
. We must bring about a situation where there is not 
a single Trotskyite wrecker left in our ranks. 
This is how the matter stands with. the question of 
how to liquidate the shortcomings in our work, common 
to all our organizations, economic and Soviet adminis- 
trative and Party. Such are the. measures necessary for 
the liquidation of these shortcomings. 
As regards the Party orgartieations in particular and 
the defects in their work, the measures necessary to liqui- 
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date these shortcomings are stated in sufficient detail i !'"' 
the draft resolution submitted for your consideration. 
therefore think there is no need to enlarge here on thii'''; 
I ~~ould. l ike to say just a few words on the questi6"ifq ! 
of political training and raising the level of our Partyv,,! 
cadres. rd 
I think that if we are able, if we succeed in giving ! 
ideological training to our Party cadres fiom top to 
I bottom and steeling them politically so that they can w:. 
find their bearings with ease in the internal and inter@ 
national situation, if we succeed in making of them fully 1 
mature Leninists and Marxists capable of solving 'the i 
I 
questions of the leadership of the country without rnakl~i' 
ing serious mistakes. then we can thereby solve nine& 
tenths of' all our tasks. 
.Ad 
How do things stand with regard to the leading forces 1 
of our Party? . 
In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata 
there are .about 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders whom I 
I would call our Party's corps of generals. 
- Ky 
Then there are qo,ooo to 40.m middle rank leader$"! 
who are our Party. corps of officers. 
Then there are about loo,- to 1~0;ooo f the lowe?' 
Party's non-commissioned officers. 
7 
rank Party command staff who are, so to speak, -our,, q 
The task is to raise the ideological level and political 
vigor of these command cadres and to introduce among ? 
them fresh forces awaiting promotion, and thus expand i 
d l  
the ranks of our leading forces. d k  #)i$$ 
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What d m  this require? 
First and foremost, we must make the proposal to 
aur Party lea&= beginning with secretaries of our Party 
units to the secmtaries of regional and republican Party 
organizations to select, during a definite 'period, two in- 
dividual~~- two Party functionaries each capable of being 
.able to a a  as their effective deputies.. 
The question may be asked: Where are we to get these 
-two deputies for each one, if we have no such people, no 
workers who correspond to these requirements? This is 
incorrect, comrades; We have tens of thousands of capa- 
ble and talented people. It only needs to know them 
and to promote them in time so that they should not 
remain in their old places too long and begin to rot. 
*Seek and ye shall find. 
Further, four-month Party- courses must be establish- 
?in each regional center to give secretaries of units Party 
training and to reequip them. The secretaries of all 
primary Party organizations (units) should be sent to 
these courses and then when they finish them and return 
lhome their deputies and the most capable members of the 
primary Party organizations should be sent to these 
.courses* 
Further, to reequip politically the first secretaries of 
the district organizations, eight-month Lenin courses 
-must be. established in the U.S.S.R., in, say, ten of the 
most important cen ten. 
The first secretaries of district and regional Party or- 
ganizations should be sent to these courses, and then 
. 
when they finish them and return home their deputies 
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and the most capable members of the district and re- 
gional organizations sent there, 
Further, ~ix-month courses for the study of history and 
the Party's policy under the Central Committee of the- 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union must be set up ta 
achieve the' ideological reequipment and political im-- 
provement of secretaries of the town Party organizations. 
The first and second secretaries of town Party organiza- 
tions should be sent to these courses and then when they 
.have finished them and return home the most capable 
members of the town Party organizations should be ' 
sent there. 
. Finally, a six-month conference on questions of in- 
ternal aqd international #olicy. under the Central Corn-- 
mittee of the C.P.S.U. must be established. 
The first secretaries of divisional and provincial or-. 
ganizations and the Centd  committees of the national: 
Communist Parties should be sent here. These comrades 
should provide not one but several persons really capabl . 
. of replacing the leaders of the Central -Committee of  our^ 
Party. This should and must be done. 
* 
I conclude, comrades. 
We have thus outlined the main defects in our work,. 
including those which are common to all our organiza- 
tions, economic, piministrative and Party, and also those 
which are specifically peculiar to Party organizations only 
-defects made use of by the enemies of the working class 
for their. diversi~iist and wrecking, espionage and terror- 
ist work. 
We have further outlined the chief measures to .be 
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taken to render harmless and liquidate the diversive, 
wrecking, espionage and terrorist assaults of the Trotsky- 
ite fascist agents of the foreign intelligence services. 
The question arises: Can we carry through all these 
measures, do we possess all the necessary possibilities for 
this? Undoubtgdly we can. We can, because we have at 
our disposal all the means necessary for the realization 
of these measures. 
What do we lack? We lack only one thing: the readi- 
ness to' liqbidate our own carelessness, our own com- 
placency, our own political shortsightedness. 
There is the rub. Cannot we who have soverthrown 
capitalism, in the main built socialism, and raised aloft 
the great banner of world communism, get rid of this 
ridiculous and idiotic disease? 
We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly 
get rid of it, given, of course, thar we will it. We will get 
rid of it, no!: just in an ordinary manner but in a Bol- 
shevik fashion, in real fashion. 
And when we get rid of this idiotic disease, we can say 
with complete confidence that we fear no enemies from 
within'or without, we fear none of their assaults, for we 
shall shatter them in the future, .as we are doing now and 
as we have done in the past. (Applause.) 
Concluding Speech 
C OMRADES, I spoke in my report about the basic questions of the matter under' discussion. The dis- 
cussion has shown that we now have complete clarity, 
have an understanding of our tasks, and that there is a 
readiness to liquidate the shortcomings of our work. But 
the discussion has also shown that there are some concrete 
questions of our organizational-political practice on 
which we have not as yet a completely clear understand- 
ing. Of-these questions, I have counted seven. , 
Allow me to say a few words on these questions. 
1. It is to be supposed that all have now understood 
and have realized that to become excessively engrossed 
in economic campaigns. and economic successes while 
underestimating and forgetting Party political problems 
leads up a blind alley. Consequently. it is necessary to 
turn the attention of our workers toward Party political 
questions, so that economic successes will be combined 
with and accompany successes in Party political work. 
Hdw in practice is the task of strengthening the Party 
political work,, the task of freeing the Party organizations 
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from economic details to be carried out? As can be seen 
from the discusion, some comrades are prone to draw 
the incomct conclusions that we should now get away 
altogether from economic work. At any rate, there were 
voices sounding this note: "Well, now, thank God, we 
shall be rid of economic matters, now we can busy our- 
selves with Pany political work." 
Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not. When our Party 
comrades, carried away with economic successes, moved 
away from politics, this was an extreme which cost us big 
saaifices. If some of our comrades, taking up the task of 
strengthening Party political work, now think of moving 
away from economy, this will be the other extreme, 
which will cost us no fewer sacrifices. You must not jump 
from one extreme to another. You must not separate 
politics from economy, just as we cannot move away from 
politics. p 
For convenience in study, people usually separate the 
methodological questions of economy from the questions 
of politics. 'But this is done merely from the standpoint 
of method, artificially, only fora the convenience of study. 
B& in life, on the contrary, politics and economy are in 
practice inseparable. They exist* together. And he who 
thinks to separate economy from politics in .our practical ' 
policy, to strengthen economic work at the cost of be- 
littling political work or, contrariwise, to strengthen 
politid work at the cost of belittling economic work, 
' 
will inevitably find himself up a blind alley. 
- The particular point in the draft resolution on the 
freeing of Party organizations from economic details and 
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the strengthening of Party political work does not mean 
moving away from economic work and economic leader- 
ship. It means, simply, no. longer to permit the practice 
of supplanting and usurping economic organs, among 
them especially agricultural organs, by our Party organ- 
. . izations. Consequently, it is necessary to master the 
method of Bolshevik leadership of economic organs. 
which lies in systematically helping these organs, svs- 
tematically strengthening them and guiding economy, 
not over. the heads of these organs but through them. 
The economic organs, and in the first place the agricul-. 
' tural organs, must be given the best people. 
These organs must receive fresh staffs, consisting of 
the best workers capable of carrying out the tasks as- I 
signed to them. Only after this work has been done will it 
be possible to count on the Party organizations being 
I -  
completely freed from economic details. This is a serious 
matter, of course, and requires a certain length of time. 
But until it is done, the Party organizations, for a &finite 
a sho* period, will still have to occupy themselves closely 
' with agricultural affairs, with all their detiils: plowing, , 
sowing, harvestings etc. 
1 I I . ' $ 
f>4$'k~$ i f i :  
n. - A few words about 'wreckers, diversionists, spies, e tc. 
It is now clear for all, I think, that the presentday wreck- 
ers and diversionists, no matter what Bag they use to 
cover themselves, the Trotskyite or the Bukharin flag, . . 
have long since ceased to be a political trend in the work- , 
ing class movement, that they have turned into a gang of - 
professional wreckers, dive~ionists, spies and murderers, 
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devoid of principles -and ideas. Of course, these gentle- 
men will have to be smashed and *ruthlessly uprooted as 
enemies of the working -class, as traitors to our country. 
This is clear and does not require further explanation. 
But here is the question--how to carry out in practice 
the task of smashing and uprooting the German-Japanese 
agents of Trotskyism. Does this mean that we should 
strike 'and-uproot not only the real Trotskyites, but also 
those who wavered at some time toward Trotskyism, and 
then long ago -came away from Trotskyism; not only 
those who are really Trotskyite agents for wrecking, but 
also those who happened once upon a time to go along 
a street where s&e Trotskyite or other had once passed? 
At any rate, such voices were heard here at the plenum. 
Can we consider su& an interpretation of the resolution 
to be correct? No, we cannot consider it to be correct. 
On this question, as on all other questions, there must 
be an individual, differentiated approach. You must not 
measure everyone with the same yardstick. Such a sweep- 
ing approach can only harm the cause of struggle against 
the real ~rotskyite wreckers and spies. 
Among our responsible comrades there are a certain 
number of former Trotskyites who left Trotskyism long 
ago, and now fight against Trotskyism not worse but 
better than some of our respected comrades who never 
chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. It would be foolish 
to vilify such comrades now. 
Among our comrades there are also those who always 
stood against Trotskyism ideologi~ally, but in spite of . 
this kept up personal contacts with individual Trotsky- 
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ites, which they did not delay in liquidating as soon as 
the actual visage of Trotskyism became clear to them. 
It is, of course, not a good thing that they did not break 
off their personal friendly .connections with individual 
Trotskyites at once, but belatedly. But it would be silly 
to lump such comdes tes. 
3. What does it mean-to select workers correctly, and 
to distribute them correctly at work? * 
This means to select workers, in the first place, accod- 
ing to a political criterion-that is, are they worthy or  
political trust? And, in the second place, according to a 
practical critetion-that is, are they suitable for such and 
such concrete work? 
This does not mean to (convert a businesdike approach 
into a "business man's" approach in which people are 
interested in the practical qualities of workers, but are 
not interested in their political physiognomy. 
This does not mean to convert a political approach 
into the single and allemblrdcng approach in which 
people are interested in the political physiognomy of 
workers,, but are not interested in their practical quali- 
fications. 
Can it' be said that this Bolshevik rule is carried our 
by. our Party comrades? ~nfortunately, it cannot be said. 
It has already been spoken of here at the plenum. But 
not everything was said. The fact is ,that this well-tried 
rule is violated bright and left in our practice and, more- 
over, in the grossest 'way. Most frequently, workers are 
selected not acording to objective ui terii, but accord- 
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ing to accidental, subjective, narrow and provincial cri- 
teria. Most frequently so-called acquaintances are chosen, 
personal friends, fellow townsmen, people who have 
shown personal devotion, masters of eulogies to their 
patrons, irrespective of whether they are suitable from a 
political and a business-like! standpoint. 
Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible 
workers. a family group, a company, is formed, the mem- 
bers of which try to live peacefully, not to offend each 
other, not to wash their dirty linen in public, to eulogize 
each other and from time to time to send inane and 
nauseating reports to the center about successes. 
It is not difficult to understand that in such conditions 
of kinship there can be no place either for criticism of 
the shortcomings of the work, or for self-criticism by 
the leaders of the work. 
Naturally, such conditions of kinship create a favorable. 
environment for generating bootlickers, people without 
any sense of digpity,*and therefore. having nothing in 
common with Bolshevism. 
Take, for example, 'comrades Minoyan and Vainov. 
The former is secretary of the regional Party organiza- 
tion in Kazakstan; the latter is secretary of the ~aroslav 
regional Party organization. These people are not 'the 
most backward workers in our midst. And how do they 
select workers? 
The former dragged along with him from Azerbaijan 
. and the. Urds, where he formerly worked, into KaialEstan 
thirty or forty of his "own" people, and placed them in 
responsible positions in Kazakstan. 
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4 .  What does it mean-to verify workers, to . check . up 
on the fulfilment of tmh? I 
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To verify workers .means to check up not on their. 
promises and dklarations, but on the result of their 
work. 
To verify the fulfilment of tasks means to check up on 
them, not only in the office and not only according to 
formal reports, but first and foremost to check up on 
them at their place of work, according to the actual re- 
sults of fulfilment. 
Do we need such a verification in general? Undoubted- 
ly we do. We need it, in the first place, because only 
such a check-up will make it possible to know a worker, 
to determine his real qualities. We need it, in the second 
place, because only such a verification will make it pos- 
sible to determine the good qualities and shortcomings 
of the executive apparatus. We need it, in the third place, 
because only such a &&-up will make it possible to 
determine the good qualities and shortcomings of the 
tasks themselves. 
Some comrades think that people can only be checked 
up on from above, when the leaders check up on sub- 
ordinates, on the results of their work. This is not true. 
.Check-up from above is necessary, of course, as one of 
the effective measures for verifying people and checking 
up the fulfilmeAt. of tasks; But verification from above 
does not exhaust by far the whole business of verification. 
There is still another kind of verification, the check-up 
from below, in 'which the masses, the subordinates, verify 
the leaders, point out their mistakes, and show the way 
of correcting them. This kind of verification is. one of the 
most effective methods of checking up on people. . 
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The rank-and-file members verify their leaders at meet- 
ings of active Party workers, at conferences and con- 
gresses, by listening to their reports, by criticizing defects, 
and finally by electing or not electing some or other 
leading comrades to. the leading Party organs. Precise 
operation of ' democratic centralism in the Party as de- 
manded by our Party statutes, unconditional elective- 
ness of Party organs, the right to put forward and to 
withdraw candidates, the secret ballot and freedom of 
criticism and self-criticism-all these and similar measures 
must be carred into life, in order to facilitate the check- 
up on, and control over, the leaders of the Party by the 
rank-and-file Pmty members. 
The. - non-Party masses check their economic, trade 
union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party active 
workers, at all kinds of mass conferences, where they hear 
reports of their leaders, criticize defects and indicate ways 
of correcting them. Finally, the people check leaders of . 
the -counuy during the elections to the Soviet Union 
organs. .of power, through universal, equal, direct and 
secret (ballot* 
The task is to link up the check from .above with that 
from below. 
m 
5. What does it mean to train cadres on the basis of 
their o*n mistakes? 
Lenin taught .that one of the surest means of correctly 
training and educating Party cadres, of correctly trainiq 
-and educating the working class and the masses of the 
working people, is to disclose conscientiously the mistakes 
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of the Pmy, to study the causes t . 4 ~  have given rise to 
.these mistakes, and to indicate the pa.h necessary for, 
overcoming these mistakes. 
Lenin said: 
"The attitude of a political party toward its own 
mistakes is one of the most important and surest 
criteria of the seriousness of the party, and of how 
it fulfils, in practice, its obligations toward its clam 
and toward the masses of werking people. To  admit 
a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyze 
the conditions wliich gave rise to it, to study atten- 
tively the means of correcting it-thek are the signs 
of a serious party; #&is means the perforniahce of its 
duties, this means educating and training the class 
and,. subsequently, the masses." 
t 
This means that the Bolshevib are in duty bound not 
to gloss over their mis-takes, not tododge the question 
of their mistakes, as often happens with us, but honestly 
and openly to admit their mistakes, honestly and openly 
to indicate the way of correcting these mistakes, honestly 
and openly to correct them. a t  
I wauld not say that many of our comrades undertake 
this business with- atisfaction. Buts if. the Bolsheviks 
really wish. to b6 Bolsheviks they must, find sullicient 
manliness in themselve openly to admit their mistakes,. 
, to reveal their. cawsI to indicate the way of correcting 
them, and thereby ts give the Party cadres correct train- 
ing and correct political education. 
For it is oaly .an this paths only tq. iaptm ;uzd ho-t, 
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selfaiticism, that Bolshevik cadres really can be edu- 
cated, that real Bolshevik leaders can be educated. 
Two examples will illustrate the correctness of Lenin's 
thesis. 
Let us take, as one example, our mistakes connected 
with the building up of the collective farms. You remem- 
ber, I imagine, the year iggo, when our Party comrades 
thought of solving the very complicated question of trans- 
ferring the peasantry to the building of collective farms 
in some three to four months, and when the Central 
Committee of the Party found itself compelled to put a 
check upon comrades who were being carried away. This 
was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our 
Party. The mistake lay in this: that our Party comrades 
forgot the voluntary character of the building of collec- 
tive farms, forgot that the peasants must not be trans- 
ferred to the collective farm path by administrative pres- 
sure, forgot that the building of collective farms required 
not several months, but several years of careful and well- 
planned work. 
They forgot all this, and did not want ,to admit their 
mistakes. You remember, I imagine, that the directions 
of the Central Committee regarding dizziness from suc- 
cess, and that our comrades in the localities should not 
leap ahead, ignoring the actual state of affairs, were met 
with hostility. But this did not prevent the Central Com- 
mittee from going against the stream, and turning our , 
Party comrsdes onto the right road. Well, then? Z 
It is now dear to everybody that jhe Party achieved 
what it wanted by turning our P a r t y ~ o d  onto; the 
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right road. We now have tens of thousands of splendid 
peasant cadres engaged in the building of collective 
farms, and in their leadership these cadres grew up and 
were trained on the basis of the mistakes of iggo. But 
we would not now have had these cadres had not the 
Party then recognized these mistakes and corrected them 
in time, 
The other example is from the field of industrial con- 
struction. I have in mind our mistakes in the Shakhty 
wrecking period. Our mistakes lay in the fact that we did 
not take into account all the dangers of the technical 
backwardness of our cadres in industry, that we put up 
with this backwardness, and thought of developing social- 
ist industrial construction on a wide scale with the 
inimically-inclined specialists, dooming our economic 
cadres to play the part of poor commissars for the bour- 
geois specialists. 
You remember, I imagine, how unwilling our economic 
cadres were to recognize their mistakes at that time; how 
unwilling they were to recognize their own technical 
backwardness, and with what difficulty they assimilated 
the slogan "Master Technique". Well, then, the facts go 
to show that the slogan "Master Technique", had its 
effects, and produced its good results. We now have tens 
and hundreds' of thousands of splendid Bolshevik eco 
nomic cadres, who have already mastered technique and 
are advancing our industry. But we would not now .have 
these cadres had the PBrty not risen to the occasion, in 
the face of the obduracy of the business executives who 
did not want to admit their technical backwardness, had 
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not the Par~y then recognized its mistakes and 
tnqn in tiny,. 
Some qmrades say w t  it .b not advisable to speak 
: apeply of one's mistakes, since the open admission o 
oqe'smistakes may be co&trued by our enemie 
neq an$ may be utilized by them 
This is rubbish, comrades, downright r 
open recognition of our mistakes and their 
fiation can, on the contrary, only strengthe 
raise its authority in the eyes of the worke 
and working intellectuals, and increase the st 
power of our state. And this is the main thing. 
as we have the workers, peasants and working intelle 
tuals with us, all the rest will settle itself. . 
other comrades say that the open admission of oud 
mistakes can lead, not to training and consolidating o 
cadres, but to weakening and disconcerting them; tha 
we must spare and tatre care. of our cadr~;  +at we mus 
spare their self-&teem and tg-anq~ilit~.' ,TO this end the 
prqp~sed to slur, ,ov.er the mistakes of our comrades, ' t 
w&zlcq:,@e vigor an$ the criticism and, still better, 
disregand these mistzkss. Such a line is not only f 
mentally incorreqt, but also dangerous in the h 
dep;ree-dangeruww . b t  and foremost, for the c 
wham they wwt, to. "spare" and "take care of". 
T o  spare: Ad preserve cadres by slurring OV& thei 
mistakes mean! , certainly to ruin these very .cadres. W 
would surely have ,ruined our collective farin Bolshevi 
cadres. had'ye not revealed the mistakes of the year+ lgio, 
a$ had ~ J G  not.. traincd them on the basis of rhese mis 
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takes. We would certainly have ruined our industrial 
Bolshevik cadres had we not revealed the mistake% of our 
comrades in the Shakhty wrecking period, and had we 
not trained ou; induskkt1 cadres on the basis of these 
mistakes. He who expects to spare the self-esteem of our- 
cadres by slurring over their mistakes ruins both the 
cadres and their self-esteem, for by slurring over their 
mistakes he facilitates the repetition of new and perhaps 
more serious mistakes which, one may presume, will lead 
to the complete downfall of the cadres, to the detriment 
of their "self-esteem" and "tranquility". 
o.  eni in taught us not only to teach the masses, but 
also to learn from them. 
What does this mean?. 
It means, first, that we leaders must not become can- 
ceited; and we must understand that if we are members 
of the Central Committee or are People's Commissars, 
this .does not mean that we possess all the knowledge 
necessary for giving correct leadership. An official p s i -  
rion by itself does not provide knowledge and experience. 
-This is still more' the case in respect to 'a title. 
This means, second, that ' our. experience alone, the 
ekpe'iefice of leaders, is insufficient to give correct leader- 
ship; that, consequently; it is necessary that one% experi- 
etice; the experience of leaders, be supplemented by the 
experience of the masses, b y  the experience of the rank- 
and-file Party members, by the experience of the working 
class, by the experiend of the people. 
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This means, third, that' we must not for one moment 
weaken, and still less break, our connection with the 
Inasses. 
This means, fourth, that we must pay careful attention 
to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rank-and- 
file members of the Party, to the voice of the so-called 
"small men", to the voice of the people. 
What does it mean-to lead correctly? 
This does not at all mean sitting in one's office and 
compiling instructions. 
T o  lead correctly means: 
First, to find a correct solution of the question. But a 
correct solution cannot be found unless account is taken 
. of the experience of the masses, who test the results of 
our leadership on their own bach. 
Second, to organize the operation of the comct .solu- 
tion which, however, cannot be done without direct aid 
from the masses. 
Third, to organize a check on the fulfilment of this 
decisiowhich, again, cannot be done without the 
d k t  aid of the masses. 
We leaders see things, events and people from one 
side only; I would say, from above. Our field of vision, 
consequently, is more or less limited. 
The masses, on the contrary, see things, events and 
people from another side; I would say, from below. Their 
field of vision, consequently, is also in a certain degree 
limited. T o  receive a correct solution to the question 
these two experiences must be united. Only in such a 
case will the leadership be correct. 
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This is what it means not only to teach the masses, 
but also to learn from them. 
Two examples to illustrate the correctness of this 
thesis of Lenin: 
It happened several years ago. We members of the 
Central Committee had discussed the question of im- 
proving the situation in the Don Basin. The draft of 
measures presented by the People's Commissariat of 
Heavy Industry was clearly unsatisfactory. The draft was 
returned to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry 
three times. Three times we received different drafts from 
- the People's Commissariat of Heavy  idu us try. And still 
they could not be considered satisfactory. Finally we de- 
cided to call in several workers and rank-and-file eco- 
nomic and trade union officials from the Don Basin. 
For three days we conversed with these comrades. And 
all of us, members of the Central Committee, had to 
recognize that only they, the rank-and-file workers, these 
"small people", had succeeded in providing us with a 
correct solution. You remember, I imagine, the well- 
known decision of the Central Committee and the Coun- 
cil of People's Commissars regarding the measures for 
increasing the output of coal in the Don Basin. Well, this 
decision of the Central Committee and the Council of 
People's Commissars, which was admitted by all our 
comrades to be a correct and even notable decision, was 
suggested to us by simple people from below. 
Another example I have in mind is the example of 
Comrade Nikolayenko. 
Who is Nikolayenko? Nikolayenko is a rank-and-file 
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member- of the Party. She is an ordinary "little person". 
For a whole year she gave warning signals as to the bad 
situation in the Kiev Party organization, exposed. the 
prevalence of family favoritism, the narrow and provin- 
cial approach to workers, the suppression of selfcriticism 
and the predominance of Trotskyist wreckers. She was 
shunned as though she were an annoying fly. Finally, in 
order to rid theniselves of her, they expelled her from 
the Party. 
Neither the Kiev organization nor the Central Com- 
mittee of the Oommunist Party of the Ukraine helped 
her to achieve the truth. It was only the interference of 
the Central Committee of the Party that helped to un- 
ravel this confused knot. And what emerged after the 
examination of the affair? It emerged that Nikolayenko 
was right, while the Kiev organization was wrong. 
Neither more nor less. And who is this Nikolayenko? 
She was not, of course, a member of the Central Com- 
mittee. She was not a People's Commissar, nor the sec- 
retary of the Kiev Regional organization. She was not 
&en secretary of some Party cell. She was only a simple 
rank-and-file Party member. 
As you see, simple people sometimes prove rn be far 
nearer to the: truth than some highly placed institutions. 
One: c0u1d'~ive tens and hundreds of such examples. . 
Thvs it turns out that our experience alone, the ex- 
perience of the leaders, is still by far inadequate for the 
guidance of our affairs. .In order to guide co~ectly, the ex- 
perience of the leaders must be supplemented - by &e 
experience of the Pany masses, by the ekperience of the 
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working class, by the experience of the toilers, by the 
experience of the seca11cd ''mall people". 
' And when is this possible? * 
1t is possible only if the leaders are dosely connected 
- with the masses, if they are bound up with the Party 
masses, with the working class, with the peasantry, with 
. .the working intellectuals. 
Contacts with * the masses, the strengthening of these 
contacts, readiness to listen to the voice of the masses- 
in this lie the strength and impregnability of Bolshevik 
leadership. 
It may be taken as a rule that so long as Bolsheviks 
keep contacts with the broad masses of the people, they 
will be invincible. And,. contrariwise, it is sufficient for 
Bolsheviks to break away from the masses and lose con- 
tact with them, to become covered with bureaucratic 
rash, for them tozlose all their strength and become con- 
verted into nonentities. 
In the system of mythology of the andent. Greeks there 
was one famous hero, Antaeua, Who, as mythology de- 
clares, was the son of Poseidon, the God of the sea, and 
Gaea, the Goddess of the~arth. He was pirticularly 
attached. to his mother, who bore him, fed him and 
brought him up so that there was no hero whom this 
Antaeus5did not vanquish. He was considered to be an 
invincible 'hero. - ~ h e i e i n  lay his strength? ' It lay in the 
fact thaievery tinhe he was hard-pushed in a struggle with 
an opponent, he touched the earth, his mother, who had 
borne him and' fed him, and thus regained new strength. 
But, nevertheless, he had a weak spot-the danger of 
t>S+! 3.01~. 
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being separated, in some way, from the earth. HIS ene- 
V A 
mies took account of this weakness of his, and waited for 
him. And an enemy was found who took advantage of 
this weakness and vanquished him. This was Hercules. 
But how did Hercules defeat him? He tore him from the 
earth, raised him into the air, deprived him of the 
possibility of touching the earth, and thus throttled him 
in the air. 
I think that Bolsheviks remind us of Antaeus, the hero 
of Greek mythology. Like Antaeus, they are strong in 
keeping contact with their mother, with the masses, who 
bore them, fed them and educated them. And as long 
as they keep contact with their mother, with the people, 
they have every chance of remaining invincible. 
This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik lead- 
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7. Finally, still a60ther question. I have'in view the 
quation of the formal and heartless bureaucratic atti- 
tude of some of our Party comrades toward the fate of 
indi-vidual Party members, toward the question of ex- 
pelling nembers from the Party, or the question of 
restoring the rights of Party membership to those who 
have been expelled. 
The fact is that some of our Party leaders suffer from 
lack of attention to people, to Party members, to work- 
ers. Furthermore, they do not study the Party members, 
do not know what is dose to their hearts, and how they 
are growing, do not know workers in general. They b v e ,  
therefore, not an individual approach to Party members, 
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to Party workers. And just because they have not an in- 
dividual approach when appraising Party members and 
Party workers, they usually act at random, either praising 
them wholesale, without measure, or crushing them, also 
wholesale, and without measure, expelling thousands and 
tens of thousands from the Party. 
Such leaders try, in general, to think in tens of thous- 
ands, not to worry about "units", about individual Party 
members, about their fate. They think it a mere bagatelle 
to expel thousands and tens of thousands of people from 
the Party, comforting themselves by the fact that our 
Party is 2,000,000 strong, and that tens of thousands of 
people expelled cannot change anything in the position 
of the Party. 
But, only people who in essence are profoundly anti- 
Party can have such an approach to members of the 
Party. 
As the result of such a heartless attitude toward 
people, toward Party members and Party workers, dis- 
content and bitterness are artificially created in a sec- 
tion of the Party, while the Trotskyite doubledealers 
adroitly seize hold-of such embittered comrades and skill- 
fully drag them after themselves into the morass of 
Trotskyite wrecking. 
The Trotskyites, by themselves, were never a big korce 
in our Party. Call to mind the last discussion on Trotsky- 
ism in our Party in 1927. This was a genuine Party refe- 
rendum. Out of 854,000 Party members, 730,000 mem- 
bers voted at that time. Among them, 724,000 Party mem- 
bers voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central Committee 
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of the Party, against the Trotskyites, and 4,000 Party 
members, or about one-half of one per cent, voted for the 
Trotskyites, while 2,600 members of the Party refrained 
from voting. 
There were ing,ooo members who did not participate 
in the voting. They did not participate either because 
they were away from home, or because their shift was at 
work when the vote was taken. If, to the 4,000 who voted 
for the Trotskyites, we add all those who refrained from 
voting, on the assumption that they also sympathized 
with the Trotskyites, and'if to this total we add, not one- 
half of one per cent of those who did not take part in the 
voting-as should be done by right-but five per cent of 
those who did not participate-that is, about 6,ooo.Party 
membe~-we obtain about 12,000 Party members who 
sympathized with Trotskyism to some extent or other. 
Here you see the total forces of the Trotskyite gentlemen. 
Add to this the fact that many out of this number 
became disillusioned with Trotskyism and left it, and 
you get a conception of the insignificance of the Trotsky- 
ite forces. And if, in spite of this, the Trotskyite wreckers 
nevertheless. have some reserves or other around our 
Party, it is because the incorrect policy of some of our 
comrades on the question of expulsion from the Party 
and reinstatement of expelled people, the heartless atti- # 
tude of some of our comrades toward the fate of indi- 
vidual Party members and individual Party workers, 
artificially engender a number of discontented and em- 
bittered people, and thus create these reserves for the 
Trotskyites. 
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A large number art: expelled for msalled 
What is passivity? It is considered, we discover, that if 
a member of thp Pmy . a has not mastered the Party pro- 
gram, he is and due for expulsion. But this i s  
not right, comrades. The statutes of our Party cannot be 
interpreted' so pedantically. To master the Party pro- 
gram one. needs to be a real Marxist, a tested and theo- 
retically trained Marxist. I do not know whether many 
Party members will be found by us in the party who have 
already mastered our program, have become genuine 
Maqists, theoretically trained and tried. If we were to 
go further along this path, we should have to 'leave only 
intellectuals and learned people in general 'in the Party. 
Who wants such a Party? We have the Leniniet formula 
about Party membership which is verified, has stood all 
tests. According to this formula, a Party member is one 
who accepts the Party program, pays membership dues 
- and works in one of its organizations. 
Note that Lenin's formula does not' speak about mas- 
tering the program, but of accepting, the program. These 
are two entirely different 'things. There is no need to 
prove Lenin was right here - a d  not our Party comrades 
who I , '  vainly mouthed about mastering the program. It is 
obvious by itseI£. If the Party took the standpoint that 
Party members om be only those comrades who have 
already ' ~ t e r e d  the program and have become theo- 
retically trained Marxists, it would not have formed 
thousands of Party circles in the Party, hundreds of 
Party schools where the Party members are taught M-- 
ism and are helped to .&aster our program: It is quite 
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dear that if the Party organizes schools and circles 
among the Party members, it is because it knows that 
the Party members have not yet succeeded in mastering 
the Party program, have not yet succeeded in becoming 
theoretically trained Marxists. 
Consequently, to correct our policy on the question of 
membership of the Party and expulsion from the Party, 
it is necessary to put an end to the present blockheaded 
interpretation of the question of passivity. 
But we have still another error in this field. The fact 
is that our comrades do not recognize the mean between 
two extremes. It is sufficient for a worker, a Party mem- 
ber, to commit some small offense, to be late two or 
three times at a Party meeting, not to pay membership 
dues for some reason or other, and in a flash he is thrown 
out of the Party. 
No interest is taken in cne degree of his offense, the 
cause of his non-appearance at the meeting, the cause 
of the non-payment of membership dues. The bureau- 
cracy of this is simply unparalleled. It is not difficult to 
understand that, precisely as the result of such a heartless 
policy, splendid skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites, 
have been thrown out of the Party. And was it impos- 
sible, before expelling them from the Party, to give a 
warning, and if this had no effect, to censure them, or 
administer a reprimand, and, if this had no effect, to set 
a period for reformation, or in the extreme case to reduce 
to the position of a candidate, but not expel them with 
a sweep of the hand from the Party? 
Of course it was possible. 
CONCLUDING SPEECH - 
But this requires an attentive attitude to people, to 
the Party members, to the fact of Party membership. And 
. 
this is exaktlv what some of our comrades lack. 
4 
It is high time to ?&. ut a ;  a- stop - ,,#..I to this outrageous - (  practice, 
comrades. p , - { l X  : .- 7 - I .  I;,?:* 
-+ - -4 
THE END 
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